Understanding more about how the brain functionsshouldhelp us understand economic behaviour. But some would have us believe that it has done this already, and that insights from neuroscience have already provided insights in economics that we would not otherwise have. Much of this is just academic marketing hype, and to get down to substantive issues we need to identify that fluff for what it is. After we clear away the distractions, what is left? The answer is that a lot is (...) left, but it is still all potential. That is not a bad thing, or a reason to stop the effort, but it does point to the need for a serious reconsideration of what neuroeconomics is and what passes for explanation in this literature. I argue that neuroeconomics can be a valuable field, but not the way it is being developed and “sold” now. The same is true more generally of behavioural economics, which shares many of the methodological flaws of neuroeconomics. (shrink)

Much behavioral welfare economics assumes that expected utility theory does not accurately describe most human choice under risk. A substantial literature instead evaluates welfare consequences by taking cumulative prospect theory as the natural default alternative, at least where description is concerned. We present evidence, based on a review of previous literature and new experimental data, that the most empirically adequate hypothesis about human choice under risk is that it is heterogeneous, and that where EUT does not apply, more choice is (...) characterized by rank-dependent utility models than by CPT. Most of the apparently loss-averse choice behavior results from probability weighting rather than from direct disutility experienced when an outcome is framed as a loss against an idiosyncratic reference point. We then consider implications of this finding for methodological debates about how to model welfare effects of policies, and argue that abandonment of a dogmatic belief in CPT as the correct theory of risk human choice exposes a conceptual error that is widespread in behavioral welfare economics. We provide concluding reflections on second-order, philosophical issues around the grounding of normative commitments in policy-focused economics. (shrink)

A principal source of interest in behavioral economics has been its advertised contributions to policies aimed at ‘nudging’ people away from allegedly natural but self-defeating behavior toward patterns of response thought more likely to improve their welfare. This has occasioned controversies among economists and philosophers around the normative limits of paternalism, especially by technical policy advisors. One recent suggestion has been that ‘boosting,’ in which interventions aim to enhance people’s general cognitive skills and representational repertoires instead of manipulating their choice (...) environments behind their backs, avoids the main normative challenges. A limitation in most of this literature is that it has focused on relatively sweeping policy recommendations and consequently on strong polar alternatives of general paternalism and strict laissez faire. We review a real instance, drawn from a consulting project we conducted for an investment bank, of a proposed intervention that is more typical of the kind that economists are more often actually called upon to offer. In this example, the sophistication of current tools for preference attribution, combined with philosophical externalism about the semantics of preferences that makes it less plausible to attribute their literal self-conscious representation to people as propositional attitude content becomes more tightly refined, blocks applicability of the distinction between nudging and boosting. This seems to call for irreducible, context-specific ethical judgment in assessing the appropriateness of the forms of paternalism that economists must actually wrestle with in going about their everyday business. (shrink)

Nobody in this debate questions the point that neuroeconomics remains full of potential, and little else as yet. If so, that really is progress of sorts. I was getting afraid that we would have to open nominations for the Captain Ahab Award for obsessive work on the promotion of neuroeconomics.

In any list of famous last words, Socrates' are likely to figure near the top. Details of the final moments of celebrities tend anyway to exert a peculiar fascination upon the rest of us: life's very contingency provokes a need to see lives nevertheless as meaningful organic wholes, defined as such precisely by their final closure; so that even the most trivial aspects of their ending can come to seem bearers of profound significance, soliciting moral reflections apparently not less urgent (...) for their being quite unwarranted. From earliest times, this fascination with last moments has come to be concentrated in particular upon last words: situated at that most mysterious of borders, between life and death, they seem to look backwards and forwards at once, judging the speaker's own past life from the vantage-point of a future realm he is about to attain and hinting at the nature of what awaits us all from the perspective of that past life he still – however tenuously – shares with us. A moment earlier, and there is no reason to privilege any one discourse of the speaker's above another; a moment later, and his lips are sealed for ever. Only in that final moment can he seem to pass an unappealable judgement on himself, to combine in a single body two incompatible subjectivities, the one suffering and extremely mortal, the other dispassionate and transcendent. If he is a thinker or a man of action, this is his last chance to summarize a lifetime's meditation or experience in a pithy, memorable aphorism.If he is a celebrated poet, he can be imagined to have composed his own epitaph; if he is a Hellenistic poet, he may even in fact have done so. (shrink)

If someone claims that individuals behave as if they violate the independence axiom when making decisions over simple lotteries, it is invariably on the basis of experiments and theories that must assume the IA through the use of the random lottery incentive mechanism. We refer to someone who holds this view as a Bipolar Behaviorist, exhibiting pessimism about the axiom when it comes to characterizing how individuals directly evaluate two lotteries in a binary choice task, but optimism about the axiom (...) when it comes to characterizing how individuals evaluate multiple lotteries that make up the incentive structure for a multiple-task experiment. We reject the hypothesis about subject behavior underlying this stance: we find that preferences estimated with a model that assumes violations of the IA are significantly affected when one elicits choices with procedures that require the independence assumption, as compared to choices elicited with procedures that do not require the assumption. The upshot is that one cannot consistently estimate popular models that relax the IA using data from experiments that assume the validity of the RLIM. (shrink)

Evidence of risk aversion in laboratory settings over small stakes leads to a priori implausible levels of risk aversion over large stakes under certain assumptions. One core assumption in statements of this calibration puzzle is that small-stakes risk aversion is observed over all levels of wealth, or over a â sufficiently largeâ range of wealth. Although this assumption is viewed as self-evident from the vast experimental literature showing risk aversion over laboratory stakes, it actually requires that lab wealth be varied (...) for a given subject as one evaluates the risk attitudes of the subject. We consider evidence from a simple design that tests this assumption, and find that the assumption is strikingly rejected for a large sample of subjects from a population of college students. We conclude that the implausible predictions that flow from these assumptions do not apply to one specialized population widely used to study economic behavior in laboratory experiments. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Giovanna Borradori. A filosofia americana: conversações com Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre e Kuhn . Traduçáo de Álvaro Lorencini. Sáo Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2003, 223 páginas.

Neste artigo revisa-se a literatura sobre paradoxos matemático-físicos gregos antigos. Trata-se de paradoxo de números irracionais, o dilema de Democritus, a antinomia de mudança, bem como os seguintes paradoxos de Zenon: a dicotomia, o Aquiles, os blocos móveis, o argumento contra a pluralidade, o dilema e a semente de painço.

Dictionary of Paradox is a fascinating reference work for scholars, students, and the general public. It describes those paradoxes that are either especially interesting today or that have a continuing interest from the historical point of view.

Resenha do livro de: Gareth B. Matthews. A Filosofia e a Criança.

The essay, based on four years of living and teaching philosophy in Brazil, is a series of aphorisms about food and hunger as concerns that have left their mark on the Brazilian mind. Alimentary jokes and homilies are retold, gustatory episodes are recalled, larders and cuisines remarked, markets and mealtimes remembered—with constant reference to the idiom of Brazilian Portuguese. The style of thinking is “postphilosophical” in the sense developed in Part II of the author's Negative Dialectics and the End of (...) Philosophy[Longwood, 1990]: it does not so much argue theses as it displays the character of the topic. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Reboul, Olivier. Introduçáo à retórica . 2. ed. Traduçáo de Ivone Castilho Benedetti. Sáo Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004. 253 páginas.

Resenha do livro de Juan Adolfo Bonaccini. Kant e o problema da coisa em si no Idealismo Alemáo : sua atualidade e relevância para a compreensáo do problema da Filosofia. Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará, 2003. 442 páginas [Coleçáo Metafísica 3].

Resenha do livro de Andrade, Abraháo Costa. O pote e a rodilha : tempo e imaginaçáo como história por fazer segundo o pensamento de Paul Ricoeur. Natal: EDUFRN, 2006. [Coleçáo Metafísica]. 134 páginas.

Resenha dolivro de: Menezes, Antônio Basílio N. Thomaz de (Org.). Ética, bioética : diálogos interdisciplinares. Natal: EDUFRN, 2006. 188 páginas.

Abstrac: In an extended discussion, within the context of a"philosophy offorestry", of the relationships of the concepts of truth and of tree some fundamental aspects of occidental metaphysics are examined from a Heideggerian perspective. But the paper tries to go beyond Heidegger's thematization of metaphysics in the context of pre-Socratic philosophy by establishing Indo-European etymology as a more inclusive horizon. In this manner, the transition from anti-metaphysics to post-metaphysics is anticipated.

Psychologists can learn from the procedural conventions of experimental economics. But the rationale for those conventions must be examined and understood lest they become constraints. Field referents and the choice of heuristic, matter for behavior. This theme unites the fields of experimental psychology and experimental economics by the simple fact that the object of study in both cases is the same.

We question the behavioral premise underlying Ainslie's claims about hyperbolic discounting theory. The alleged evidence for humans can be easily explained as an artefact of experimental procedures that do not control for the credibility of payment over different time horizons. In appropriately controlled and financially motivated settings, human behavior is consistent with conventional exponential preferences.

L’auteur situe l’intérêt intense suscité par les Présocratiques en Allemagne dans les années 1920 dans le contexte de la philologie classique tout en le reconduisant au mouvement de fascination pour l’« archaïque » apparu au cours du dernier quart du xixe siècle. L’auteur montre que ce phénomène trouve sa source dans l’« invention » des Présocratiques par Nietzsche, au point que la réception des Présocratiques, notamment d’Héraclite, peut être considérée comme une réception déguisée de Nietzsche, ce qui éclaire d’un jour (...) nouveau l’invocation du « premier commencement » grec dans le Discours de rectorat de Heidegger.The author situates the interest in Pre-Socratic philosophy in Germany in the 1920s in regard to classical philology, linking this renewal to a fascination with the « archaic » that arose at the end of the 19th century. Critical here is the way this phenomena is rooted in a modern « invention » of Pre-Platonic thinkers through Nietzsche, one that culminates with figures such as Heraclitus functioning as a mask for Nietzsche reception, a philological and hermeneutical situation which illuminates the topic of the « first Greek beginning » in Heidegger’s Rectorial Address. (shrink)